historical-critical studies end. Given what the experts say was the wisdom of Aristotle, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Thomas Aquinas, what does their wisdom mean for us as human beings in our world? The reader is treated to an inquiry into being that covers truth, knowledge, love, desire, affective knowing, person, imago Dei, likeness, perfection, participation, God, providence, evil, shame, guilt, morality, art, and glory. In more than a few of the essays, the topics at hand are discussed in light of an opening statement about the current state of Western culture and prevailing opinions. Many of the essays are thus a kind of metaphysical commentary on the days of our life here below. These are sapiential essays that treat being, not only sub specie aeternitatis, but also as we live out our being clothed in circumstances.
JAMES BRENT, O.P.
The Catholic University of America
Washington, DC Any visitor to the annual International Congress of Medieval Studies in Kalamazoo, Michigan or to the Medieval Academy of America annual conference will be aware that medieval studies is by no means one thing. Rare is the scholar who can (or wants to) converse with both the Scholastic philosophers on the one hand and the Langland scholars on the other. Michelle Karnes is one of those rare scholars, as this ambitious and wellcrafted volume demonstrates. This study begins with Aristotle's theory of cognition, journeys through St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure, and Piers Plowman, and ends with the Middle English translations of the pseudoBonaventurean Meditationes de vita Christi. Such an interdisciplinary scope is admirable and marks clear and hopeful promise for a growing dialogue in medieval studies between philosophers and theologians on the one hand and literary critics on the other.
Karnes, a literary critic herself, aims to demonstrate how medieval cognitive theory, specifically the Bonaventurean strong understanding of the role of the imagination, influenced and infused devotional practices such as meditations on the life of Christ. She argues that, under such influence, medieval writers conceived of the imaginative meditation as a path "from sensory knowledge of [Christ's] humanity to spiritual knowledge of his divinity" (20) . Her case is built fundamentally around two central chapters on the thought of Bonaventure. The first chapter thus serves as a kind of prequel, tracing the history of the imagination, primarily in the Aristotelian tradition, from the Philosopher himself, through Avicenna and Averroës, up through Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. For Karnes, the Aristotelian tradition develops a sophisticated account of the necessity of the imagination (phantasia) to bridge the gap between sensory knowledge of material things and immaterial intellectual understanding. Imagination prepares and assembles sensory input into a form from which the intellect can abstract intelligible species. Thomas Aquinas extends this tradition and expands imagination's power by arguing that imagination's phantasms conduce not only to the knowledge of an object's essence but also to knowledge of its particularity. With this claim, the stage is set for the second chapter's "Bonaventurean Synthesis."
Refreshingly, Karnes makes no effort to puff up a case for Bonaventure by contrasting him with Aquinas. Instead, she suggests that Bonaventure shares Aquinas's fundamental Aristotelian conceptions in much of his own theory. Bonaventure's account is distinct in the way he synthesizes Augustine's cognitive theory with this tradition. Karnes's own account of Augustine and Bonaventure follows the mainstream account of the Augustinian "illumination theory" developed so carefully by Stephen Marrone's two-volume history, The Light of Thy Countenance (Leiden: Brill, 2001), with no apparent knowledge of the critical revisionist account offered by Lydia Schumacher (Divine Illumination [Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2011]), which was published at the same time as Karnes's book. The distinctive feature of Bonaventure's synthesis was to understand that the presence of Christ in all human knowing as its exemplary cause and regulating and motivating principle creates the foundations for a "cognitive mysticism," an ascent to the knowledge of God in and through human cognition. Christ, the "species" of the Father as generated exemplar, acts upon the human imagination as the intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm. The presence of the light of Christ is present in every act of human knowing. Karnes then argues that this "cognitive mysticism" is not simply posited in Bonaventure's Scholastic writings on cognition, but put into play in his meditative spiritual writings, too.
Thus follows a chapter that considers Bonaventure's Itinerarium and Lignum vitae as exemplary cases of just the sort of "cognitive mysticism" theorized in other places. Karnes's reading of the Itinerarium shares real affinities with the cognitive realism of contemporary Bonaventure scholars such as Gregory LaNave, with a few important differences, which I will discuss below. Her reading of the Lignum vitae is crucial to her project as a whole, as it argues that Bonaventure enriches a young but vibrant tradition of meditations on Christ through a deeper synthetic Augustinian/Aristotelian account of the cognitive role of imagination. For Bonaventure, in the imagination, "Christ acts on the mind's image of himself in order to lead the cognizing meditant from his humanity to his divinity" (139). Karnes's "cognitive mysticism" essentially boils down to this: "spiritual union begins with the mind's proper us of its own images" (140).
In the next three chapters, Karnes traces the trajectory of the Bonaventurean synthesis in the pseudo-Bonaventurean Meditationes vitae Christi, Langland's Piers Plowman, and other later texts, into the Middle English translations of the fourteenth century. Karnes's case in these chapters is not so much that the later authors inherit all the ins and outs of Bonaventure's Scholastic cognition theory, but rather that they inherit a deep Bonaventurean confidence in the fundamental capacity of the imagination to lead the meditator from Christ's humanity to his divinity. When early modern authors decry their medieval predecessors as fancifully subject to a vivid imagination, Karnes will agree that they were deeply concerned with the imagination. Yet the medieval imagination was not the antirational enthusiasm feared by the early moderns, but a rich inheritance of confidence in the integral place of imagination in cognition and reasoning itself.
Karnes is a fresh and stimulating reader of texts. Her reading of Bonaventure both suffers and gains from this fresh perspective. On the one hand, Karnes brings new life to Bonaventure's illumination theory-no longer a last-ditch effort to preserve an Augustinian tradition in the face of an encroaching Aristotelianism, or, as Schumacher would have it, a Franciscan apologetic invention that distorts Augustine. Instead, Karnes discovers a deeply Aristotelian and Augustinian integral vision, both theoretically sophisticated and practically applicable, of natural human knowledge's path to supernatural knowledge of God through meditation. On the other hand, Karnes's fresh eyes for the text make no reference to the ways Bonaventure strives not only to connect but also to distinguish natural human knowing from knowledge of God as such. Karnes avoids exploring Bonaventure's own term "contuition" as a name for the kind of knowing one has of God in any act of knowing. Similarly, she avoids the language of "spiritual senses," a notion much studied in Bonaventure and a crucial means by which Bonaventure both establishes parallels between natural knowledge and knowledge of God and distinguishes between them; spiritual senses are like corporal senses, but they are not the same. Karnes seems to suggest a kind of seamless flow from the constructive work of meditation on the life of Christ to the unitive mystical knowledge of God. Bonaventure, I think, resists this too-easy flow.
This criticism should not discourage the potential reader. Indeed, as I say above, I applaud Michelle Karnes's engagement with the Scholastic tradition, too often "where angels fear to tread." Her summaries of the Aristotelian tradition are sound and compelling, and her awareness of Bonaventure's deep Aristotelianism is a welcome reminder to us all of the shared patrimony of Bonaventure and Aquinas, two great doctors of the Church. I hope readers of this journal respond in kind and begin to explore the medieval literary legacy.
And on this journey into a foreign land, Karnes's later chapters can be a fascinating guide.
KEVIN HUGHES

Villanova University
Villanova As rich as the teaching of the Second Vatican Council was, there are points of emphasis and de-emphasis that continue to raise concern. Often the most important concepts are the most problematic. Take, for example, "communion," which, on the eve of his resignation, Pope Benedict XVI called the central concept of the council. Yet, in the same address to the Roman clergy, distinguishing between the "real council" and the "council of the media," Benedict lamented that the latter propagated a "political hermeneutic" according to which the liturgy was seen primarily as a "community activity" rather than an "act of faith."
Something similar happened to the concept of the priesthood. The council deepened our understanding of the ministerial aspect of the priesthood, but, in doing so, lightened the emphasis on its sacrificial nature. Furthermore, though it broadened the magisterial teaching on bishops and the laity, it gave less attention to elaborating a theology of the priesthood.
In The Assault on Priesthood, Lawrence Porter laments these conciliar deemphases, and he is not alone. Avery Dulles and Joseph Ratzinger raised similar complaints, and John Henry Newman had foreseen the day when a shift in the theology of the priesthood would result in confusion over its essence. Porter tries to repair the damage by exploring a range of biblical passages that deal with the priesthood. He focuses on ten examples of the Levitical priesthood and on the priestly ministries of Jesus and Paul. Porter's method is both original and practical, relying on scriptural insights to formulate concrete applications to everyday ministry. His goal is not to put together a comprehensive theology of the priesthood but to survey the main concerns that have occupied the Church since Vatican II.
Thomas Aquinas does not play a major role in Porter's project, but he does appear frequently. A few preliminary remarks about Aquinas's theology of the priesthood are therefore in order. In his commentary on the Letter to the Hebrews, Aquinas lays what many deem the cornerstone of his theology of the
